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ABSTRACT 
 
The following is an attempt to view and perceive the problematic act of 
interpretation, including its nature, its endless controversies, its horizons and its 
limitations. The paper is comprised of two sections. The first is an introduction 
covering the various aspects of the interpretive act. It also deals with the vast 
potentialities opened up by interpretation. The second section shows some of the 
limitations of interpretation, as seen in the different interpretations of   Conrad's 
Heart of Darkness and Shakespeare's Hamlet. The approach  used throughout is 
ambivalent in that it stresses the merits and drawbacks of interpretation in reading 
and understanding texts.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the salient topics much discussed in contemporary literary theory is 
the concept of 'interpretation'. At first glance, this may seem peculiar if we 
recall that the critical processes comprising the analysis, appreciation, and 
study of literature are more or less 'interpretive' acts, essentially concerned 
with the problem of perceiving latent meanings or dissecting textual 
strategies in pursuit of what is not stated. However, as the following pages 
will show, this axiomatic activity has been recently problematised in such a 
way that that there is a dire need to sort things out and judge for ourselves 
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the validity or invalidity of the arguments presented for the act of 
interpretation or against it.                                                                     
      Interpretation is, first and foremost, a broad term that covers a whole 
gamut of humanistic activities and disciplines such as philosophy, 
psychology, theology, law, history, anthropology, literature, art, and 
linguistics. Even the activities of politics and the media can be subsumed 
under the general rubric of interpretation. Indeed, the first questions raised 
by man regarding his existence and relation with an intimidating 
environment and lurking threats, his grasp of unappeased conflicts and 
apprehensions, are all manifestations of interpretation; no matter how 
rudimentary and incoherent they might be. There is no doubt that the 
outstanding instances of human thought revolve around this invariable 
interpretive axis. Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (1961) is a seminal work 
that seeks to ascertain 'plausible' meanings in a very murky area—that of 
dreams. His other influential work Civilization and Its Discontents (1929) 
serves much the same function. In both, Freud capitalises on different 
techniques, including condensation, displacement, splitting, and wish 
fulfilment, in order to reach his goal of developing meaningful concepts. Not 
merely content with psychoanalysing actual cases, he also undertakes to 
explore artistic texts and figures. In another context, Freud analyses Da 
Vinci's famous and controversial painting 'The Mona Lisa'; in terms that 
reflect his remarkable interpretive skills, he pursues the subtle nuances of the 
work that evoke the infantile roots of Da Vinci's own sexual and artistic 
inhibitions (Hayman 1947: 45).                                                                                          
       In the fields of sociology and history, interpretation is also seen as an 
active and activating force. Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization: A 
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1965) manipulates exegetes and 
interpretive devices to the fullest, in order to show the drastic impact of 
economic and social context on an individual's psychic and mental 
breakdown. As a whole, this is a process of interpreting  economic factors 
and their roles in moulding individuals according to a priori, calculated 
formula of give and take, cause and effect. In his significant work, Richard 
Howard epitomises the interpretation of the relationship between individual 
and community and its wide-ranging impact: 'The subjectivity of the insane 
is both a call and abandonment of the world," he writes, "is it not the world 
itself that what we should ask the secret of its enigmatic status? '(quoted by 
During 1992: 56) Such ontological arguments may give the false impression 
that interpretation is a recent, even 20th century phenomenon. In fact, 
however, interpretation is as old as mankind itself. We remember the classic 
methods and strategies employed in the Dialogues of Plato and Aristotle and 
their striking repetitions. The dialogic method, as Bakhtin reminds us, is 
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more effective in substantiating relevant points and bringing home the 
import of a given text. All religious books, whether part of Judaism, 
Christianity or Islam, devote a good amount of space to the role of 
interpretation and its significant role. Indeed, the niche Prophet Joseph 
enjoyed and his achievement of the Pharaoh's favour 'are due to his correct 
interpretations of the latter's dreams' (Lodge & Wood, 1988: 380). All of this 
is evidence that interpretation as an activity is common in all cultures and 
ages.                                                                    
      The fact of the matter is that interpretation is part and parcel of human 
disciplines and of man's conscious and unconscious wishes. Horoscopes and 
the ancient icons and engravings all attest to this inescapable fact. However, 
it has to be stated in advance that the present view of interpretation is 
exclusively confined to the critical domain and its problems. Hermeneutics, 
the study of the Scriptures or theology, is beyond the scope of the present 
study, although casual references pertinent to that field will be made where 
relevant.                                                                                               
      What is interpretation, after all? Are we free to interpret things in 
whatever way we choose, capitalising on Derrida's assertion that meaning is 
essentially absent and that it is the reader or the recipient who creates or 
generates that meaning? Or are there some linguistic and semiotic indicators 
that can function as catalysts for the generation of different and plausible 
interpretations of the same event? What makes such hints or allusions 
capable of being interpreted in the proper or desired sense? Questions of this 
sort are not easy to answer with certainty and conclusiveness. The only thing 
we are sure of is that interpretation is basically a cogent critical tool that 
helps in elucidating texts and clarifying their meanings and nuances if it is 
applied with caution and subtlety. Moreover, interpretation can help in 
creating brilliant and surprising readings of the same text, provided that the 
individual undertaking this task is properly qualified for it. As T.S. Eliot 
puts it (1920: 22), 'The interpreter's task should be to elucidate the meanings 
of a text, and not to restrict to just one'. In suggesting such an idea, Eliot is a 
forerunner in affirming the multiplicity of meanings and the interpreter's role 
in deducing or generating meanings other than those intended or planned by 
the author. This is so because the humanities are not a matter of empirical 
knowledge—hence, the freedom to find a host of meanings at different 
levels of a text. In other words, interpretation is essentially a linguistic 
process that keeps track of the linguistic medium, construing it and charging 
it with as many conceptual significations as the text allows. As Christopher 
Norris argues,   
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The theory of interpretation is simply an account of how we, as competent 
language-users, habitually 'do things with words' and the ethics of mutual 
understanding, with its own distinct set of humanist and rationalist values 
squarely opposed to all forms of religious and pro-theological dogma. 
(McGuirk 1982: 87).     
                                        
No matter how 'competent' we might be in dealing with language, 
whether in producing or perceiving it, it remains essentially elusive and 
inconclusive. It always has the potential to drive the individual to find out 
suggestions and nuances inherent in its very structure. Moreover, language is 
not merely a reflection of reality or of the world: it is a world of its own that 
has its own laws and codes (Barry 2002: 44).                                       
One of the relevant issues in this regard is Jacques Derrida's metaphor 
about the inevitable resemblance between the clothes man wears to hide 
many parts of his body and the meanings of words that remain concealed 
and have to be unravelled and decoded by the interpreter. He is quoted as 
having said, man wears a good image of all that is hidden in his existence, 
including the linguistic meanings (Wise 2002: 124). Derrida's own 
judgment, as suggested here, shows that he sees language as inseparable 
from human understanding or misunderstanding. This is because the 
linguistic meaning 'emerges only provisionally, from an endless process of 
re-interpretation' (Desilet 2005: 1). Given this concept of the linguistic 
medium as mystifying, particularly in terms of "the instability of meaning" 
(Hughes 2002: 11), one perceives the validity of and justification for the 
process of interpretation and the role assigned to it. Hence the interpreter is 
free to erect his own 'Bible of interpretations', as Hirsch rightly puts it (1967: 
127). As regards the process of practicing interpretation, one has to recall 
that the interpreter's objective usually centres on two basic points: 'the author 
criticism and reader criticism' (Hogan 2006: 101). These is two constituents 
of the creative process whose relation to each other is organic and reciprocal.                        
        Interpretation, then, is fully steeped in the close study of the text and 
the theory of reading and its endless controversies. The reason is clear 
enough: when the interpreter embarks on his enterprise, he inevitably faces 
the problematics of the text, the mental processes taking place in his mind, 
and the role of memory in contrasting the chosen text with others and 
properly prioritising it. George Poulet, in his Criticism and the Experience of 
Interiority (1966), identifies the imperceptible changes taking place in the 
reader's consciousness when he encounters the text:                                      
                                                                                                           
When I read, I mentally pronounce  an I, and yet the I that I pronounce is not 
myself. "Je est un utre", said Rimbaud. Another I, who has replaced my own 
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and who will continue to do so as long as I read. Reading is not just that: a 
way of giving way not only to a host of alien words, images, ideas, but also 
to the very alien principle which utters and shelters them (Selden 1988: 201).                          
                 
      Accordingly, the discerning reader or critic undertaking the task of 
interpreting texts has to extract those 'alien' elements and put them in a new 
matrix. In another relevant context, there is the argument for considering the 
interpreter's task as having something to do with 'refiguring the type' (Bird 
2004: 17). This is a re-working of the paradigm that creates a more 
comprehensive image of a given text corresponding to the author's 
perceptions as well as to those of the reader. Interpretation cannot survive 
without a deep understanding of the writing process, its strategies, and sign-
systems because the interpreter's act consists of decoding these signs in 
order to ascertain or generate the desired or most convincing and plausible 
interpretation. The interpreter draws partly on his knowledge of different 
critical schools and methods, including new criticism, structuralism, post-
structuralism and semiotics, as well as from a great interest in the linguistic 
unit and its indeterminate and unpredictable meanings or suggestions. 
Knowing or ascertaining the etymological aspect of the linguistic unit, its 
structural constituents, its historical context and its ceaseless developments 
in terms of meaning and connotations is a prerequisite for competent and 
convincing interpretation. Indeed, the problem of meaning or, if you will, 
'the meaning of meaning' is itself a controversial issue that has occupied a 
vast space in the arguments of critics, scholars, historians and even creative 
writers. For instance, one of the sayings of the French poet Paul Valery 
(1871–1945) is that there is no real meaning in a certain text (Eco 1979: 79). 
Also, the French arch-modernist Gustave Flaubert (1821–1888) declares that 
what is ostensibly meaningless entails a further meaning surpassing all that 
is meaningful (Barthes 1968: 7). However, in their book with the same title, 
critics Ogden and Richards have sought to develop a sort of compromise 
between the intentions of the producer (speaker or author) and those of the 
customer (recipient or auditor),                                               
 
Is the meaning of a sentence that which is in the mind of the speaker at the 
moment of utterance or that which is in the mind of listener  at the moment of 
audition? Never, I think. Certainly not that which is in the mind of the 
listener, for he may utterly misconstrue the speaker's purpose. (Ogden & 
Richards 1923: 193)                                   
 
      At any rate, the absence or inconclusiveness of meaning, or at least a 
certain scepticism about its presence, is in fact a point on which a host of 
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critics and researchers almost unanimously agree. An entire critical trend in 
contemporary literary theory (post-structuralism or deconstruction) locates 
its overriding principle in the problematics of meaning, the dwindling role of 
the author in the text and the new dawn rising before the reader. All of these 
are at work in the rigorous activity of interpretation and the influential task it 
is undertaking at this time. Deconstruction as theorised and practiced by its 
advocates and apologists emphasises as a starting-point of the task of 
dismantling Western logo-centric and Aristotelian assumptions. In their 
place, it aims to erect its scepticism about the certainty of meaning or the 
existence of any clear-cut, specific denotations. What is of primary interest 
here is the ignoble, tacit, marginalised and banned. The French 
deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (1930–2005) delimits the characteristics 
of the writing game and thereby establishes the interpretive space and its 
vast potentiality. He de-historicises the writing process and strips it of 
anything outside its intrinsic and formal aspects,  
 
1. A written sign can be repeated in the absence not only of the subject 
who emitted it in a specific context but also of a specific addressee. 
 
2. The written sign can break with its real context and be read in a 
different context regardless of what its writer intended. 
 
3. The written sign is subject to 'spacing' (espacement) in two senses: 
first, it is separated from other signs in a particular chain; secondly, 
it is separated from 'present reference' (that is, it can refer to 
something not actually present in it. (Selden 1988: 174)  
 
Obviously, Derrida dismisses here any extra-textual and linguistic 
elements, including the producer of the text. Like Roland Barthes in his 
famous declaration of the demise of the author ('Death of the Author'), 
Derrida raises similar doubts about any role assigned to the author after the 
publication of his text. In the stage following publication, there is an 
unprecedented appropriation of the text and its potential meanings by the 
reader or interpreter—hence, the vast freedom of the interpreter to exercise 
'free play' in the given text in the absence of its author, including the ability 
to coin new logisms and connotations as much as the text permits. Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), a key figure in reception theory and 
interpretation, makes arguments similar to those of Maurice Blanchot 
(1907–2003), Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and Jacques Derrida. In 
Gadamer's view, writing involves self-alienation. Hence, the process of 
understanding and interpretation moves entirely in the linguistic orbit 
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through the act of scrutinising the sign and finding or producing its multiple 
nuances and connotations. As he puts it, 'because the meaning has 
undergone a kind of self-alienation through being written down, this 
transformation is the real hermeneutic task. The meaning of what has been 
said is to be stated a new, simply on the basis of the words passed on by 
means of the written signs' (Newton 1988: 51). Thus, all the postulates and 
findings of linguists are put at the service of the interpreter and his 
painstaking (or hair-splitting) task. The linguistic tool, then, is the sole 
prerogative of both creative writer and interpreter. As William Gas states, 
the novelist, if he is any good, will keep imprisoned in his language; there is 
literally nothing beyond (Graff 1979: 60). Susanne Langer stresses the self-
centredness of the literary point of reference in that the linguistic sign does 
not refer to anything physical or actual outside itself,                                                               
  
Poets deal with the language of their poets, not with life, with 'virtual life', 
which is much an illusion as the space created in a painting. Poetry is never a 
statement about historical facts…Literary events are made, not reported. 
(Langer 1953: 88)  
 
 The overriding emphasis on the linguistic medium can often be 
exaggerated and developed to such extremes that the actual meaning 
becomes subject to distortion and nullification. The critic Graff argues to 
this effect when he states that meaning is non-existent, and then language 
itself becomes question-begging, Since meaning arises wholly from the play 
of differences within an artificial sign system, it follows that meanings are 
arbitrary and that everything we say is arbitrary and that everything we say 
in language is a fiction (Graff 1979: 60). Saussure has already shown the 
arbitrary relation between the signifier (sign) and the signified (concept), but 
this useful differentiation has been overused such that the internal meaning 
of the sign has fully vanished or hopelessly blurred. In a situation like this, 
the task of interpretation becomes more demanding and challenging but also 
more rewarding. Thus, the freedom that the interpreter enjoys in stripping 
the sign of a fixed and final meaning requires that he depend on his common 
sense and experience in figuring out the relevant nuances and thus shades of 
meaning a text may hold (or is made to hold).                                                                        
      Before embarking on these speculations about the thorny problem of 
interpretation, it is necessary to refer to the psychological and intellectual 
status of the critic undertaking this interpretive project, given the vital role it 
plays in colouring and determining his perspective on the texts in question. 
One of the relevant statements in this regard is what the critic Juhl notes: 
The meaning of a literary work is said to be defined in part by the historical 
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situation of the critic (Juhl 1979: 4). The social and historical circumstances 
surrounding the critic or interpreter have a decisive impact on his eventual 
judgments and appraisals of a particular text. In other words, if the objective 
factors are relevant and critical in determining the final and most cogent 
interpretation, the subjective ones are no less useful to the critic's specific 
interpretations and the perspective adopted in dealing with those texts. As a 
discerning reader, the interpreter or critic analyses the text and his (the 
interpreter's) own experiences as an individual living in a particular time and 
space. Consequently, this factor plays a significant role in shaping his 
interpretations and insights. Edward Said, for instance, would not have 
analysed and judged texts the way he did if he had not experienced the 
terrible repercussions of exile in an unfavourable environment. The same 
holds true for Homi Bhabha's arguments on and interpretations of Western 
discourse. The type of interpretation offered by Aurbach's Mimesis: The 
Representation of Reality in Western Literature (1953) is partly explained by 
the circumstances that accompanied the composition of that influential 
treatise.                                                            
     The other point worth mentioning here is the essentially relativistic 
nature of interpretation. We may be privy to a huge number of 
interpretations of the same literary text or phenomenon, and it is difficult to 
prioritise any one in particular, as each has its own raison d'e'tre. Hirsch puts 
the matter this way:                                                                                                            
 
When someone's meaning is incomplete or false, we are able to say that it is 
inadequate to its subject matter only if we have, or believe that we have, a 
more complete and true conception of the subject matter than the author. But 
suppose we, in turn, express our superior conception of the subject matter 
and are judged by a further critic who believes that he has still truer or 
broader than our own. He in turn will say that our meaning is inadequate, and 
he will do so as the basis of a still different conception of the interpretation. 
Now, in each case, the judgment of the two critics might be right. (Hirsch 
1967: 59) 
 
That interpretation is a matter of the relative rather than the absolute or 
conclusive, as is stressed by many critics, particularly the advocates of           
the deconstructive inclination. J. Hillis Miller (b.1928), in addressing 
Nietzsche's challenge regarding 'the concept of rightness' in interpretation, 
even repeats Derrida's doctrine about the multiplicity of meanings when he 
states that the same text authorises innumerable interpretations: there is no 
correct interpretation (Lodge &Wood 1988: 244).                                                        
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     Two factors interfere and become manifest in the interpretive process 
that eventually show that interpretation is, in the final analysis, a matter of 
subjectivity and personal judgment. Stanley Fish (b.1938), a leading figure 
in reception theory, identifies a phenomenon that is very indicative of the 
nature and particularity of interpretation: the same reader will perform 
differently when reading two different texts, and different readers will 
perform similarly when reading 'the same text'. Fish's conclusion is cogent 
enough: 'Both the stability of interpretation among readers and the variety of 
interpretation in the career of a single reader would seem to argue that the 
existence of something independent of and prior to interpretive acts, 
something which produces them' (Ibid.: 301–302).                                               
        The interpretive process has its own foundations and criteria in 
performing this activity. Undoubtedly, interpretation—for all its clashing 
claims and views, as already pointed out—is not an arbitrary and haphazard 
domain. The plausibility or verisimilitude of a particular interpretation and 
the reasons for ruling out other adjacent interpretations are relative matters 
but have their own epistemological foundations, so that they can have their 
own validity that is to be accepted by the reader. Once again, Juhl's 
statement is helpful here. He clarifies this point in identifying the foundation 
for the right or most plausible interpretation, saying that 'the  plausible or 
admissible interpretation of a literary work must satisfy linguistic 
constraints, certain requirements of textual coherence and general rules as 
conventions of literary interpretations' (Ibid.: 208). As regards the evidence 
that the interpreter makes use of in his task, it could be the appeal of the text 
or that of certain key phrases, situations or events.                                                                   
      All of these choices have to conform to the interpreter's or reader's 
preconceived ideas of what a particular literary or non-literary text should 
be. In other words, the reading of a certain text is not an innocent or 
amateurish activity. Rather, it is the outcome of a particular aesthetic and 
ideological theory that the interpreter adopts before embarking on this task. 
The act starts when the interpreter finds that a particular metaphor recurs in 
more than one situation and sees that it is necessary to explain how that 
particular metaphor is imbued with particular connotations and suggestions. 
Some characters or situations hold the alluring potential for the interpreter to 
infer a multitude of meanings from them. Likewise, the more open, realistic 
texts do no have much to offer the interpreter because they are self-evident 
in their structural and linguistic framework.                                          
       The other principle of coherent and persuasive interpretation is a focus 
on the inner logic of the text, irrespective of the author's professed 
intentions. The autonomy of the literary signal and its possible meanings 
could be taken as the only criterion the interpreter capitalises on in dealing 
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with the literary text. In this regard, Robert Scholes's arguments are 
illuminating. He finds that interpretive skills involve tacit and intuitive 
procedures that 'have proved highly resistant to systematisation and hence 
difficult to transmission in an indirect or formal way' (Scholes 1982: 1–2). 
This is another way of saying that the individual talent of the interpreter is 
not only laudable, but also necessary if one hopes to fulfil the desired 
objectives of the interpretive process.                                          
        Success, brilliance and persuasiveness are elements with which not 
every interpreter is endowed. Although interpretation draws upon linguistic 
analysis, skill and sleight of hand, there is a further condition to be met 
before one reaches the desired interpretation. Stanley Fish, in his 
'Interpreting the Variorum', suggests that 'the ability to interpret is not 
required; it is constitutive of being human' (Con Davis 1989: 722). In other 
words, the interpreter's skill basically exists at birth and is no less significant 
than the creative writer's. However, this natural faculty can be sharpened and 
cultivated through continuous study and practice. For instance, familiarity 
with the etymology of words and their changeable meanings can help the 
interpreter to deduce tacit or intended suggestions. The term "my love", for 
instance, when used between men in the Elizabethan era, had connotations 
that were very different from those invoked in contemporary usage of the 
phrase. This distinction creates a need to remain vigilant and not to blur the 
two different time-periods and their contexts or ignore the subsequently 
distinct connotations of those different uses.                             
     All types of critical studies have proliferated in the last fifty years or 
so. It is striking to note that figurative language is not merely found in 
creative literature now. Rather, its agent of explanation (criticism) has 
thrived on the use of such techniques. Accordingly, we come across terms 
that are originally found in creative literature, such as 'the rustle of language' 
(Barthes 1986: 1), semiotics, tying or untying the text, taming the text, 
encoding or decoding, or even 'the rape of the text' (Graff 1979: 30). A 
discourse of this sort betrays a desire on the part of critics to make criticism 
(and by extension, interpretation) a self-dependent, autotelic activity. Apart 
from the distinct terminology it makes use of in order to cultivate a strong 
sense of plausibility, interpretation is generally to be differentiated from 
understanding. Inter-pretation is a step ahead, farther than understanding, 
although it hinges on understanding as an indispensable element of itself. It 
is logical to infer that understanding is the starting-point for any fruitful 
interpretation. Hirsch uses another instance of figurative language to show 
the difference between the two: 'Understanding is silent while interpretation 
is garrulous' (1967: 135). I would add that understanding is a constant 
element for all types of readers, while interpretation represents the variable 
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whose value is ascertained in accordance with the angle used by the 
interpreter and his skill and talent in probing texts and their underlying 
implications. Understanding is less demanding and problematic than 
interpretation. Interpretation, then, is a special field that does not tolerate 
amateurish interests or incompetent persons. Interpretation, in the words of 
Paul Ricoeur, is 'a particular case of understanding. It is the understanding 
applied to the written expressions of life…interpretation only appears as the 
one province within the empire of comprehension and understanding' 
(Ricoeur 1976: 74). Understanding and comprehension are only preliminary 
steps in the process of successful interpretation. In fact, only the experts and 
connoisseurs who have mastered the rules and requirements of interpretive 
acts are entitled and expected to provide their own analyses and formulations 
of texts. Thus linguistic competence, a vast knowledge of humanities and a 
subtle intuitive power are some of the prerequisites for successful and 
weighty interpretation.                                                                                                
      The relation of the present text to its predecessors and the reciprocal 
effects of each on the other are of prime importance here in reaching the best 
possible interpretation. T.S. Eliot writes about this issue in his 'Tradition and 
Individual Talent' (1920), in which he stresses the inextricability of the 
present from the past and of the personal from the impersonal. This 
insightful judgment is helpful for the interpreter because he is expected to 
view the new text from different perspectives, including its relation to earlier 
texts in his tradition or to its worldwide contexts. Jaus calls this relation 'the 
horizon of expectations' in that the new text is arranged parallel to or in 
contrast with those already in existence. In this way, similarities, differences, 
borrowings, and innovations can be foregrounded and revealed. The literary 
text, in Jaus's view, 'awakens memories of that which was already read, 
brings the reader to a specific emotional attitude, and with its beginning 
arouses expectations from the middle and end' (Selden 1988: 207). The final 
judgment regarding any given text derives its impact from 'the successive 
unfolding of the potential for meaning in the stages of its historical 
reception' (Ibid.: 211).                                                       
         If one leaves aside the dialectic of the past and present and its effect 
on the nature of literary texts, the other issue related to interpretation 
becomes the question of what is the best procedure for or method of eliciting 
tacit levels of meaning. If the objective datum or 'literal meaning does not 
pose a problem for the interpreter, the latent or hidden ones do' (Schauber 
1986: 10). Indeed, these meanings arouse much dispute and discontent. The 
original text is the decisive factor or arbiter in determining the strategy that 
the interpreter must adopt in dealing with that text. What should be kept in 
mind, however, is that interpretation must stem from the goodwill of the 
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interpreter and his readiness to see himself as a collaborator, not a self-
imposed censurer or detractor. Any attempt to interpret a particular text 
according to a ready-made, opinionated, or preconceived set of rules alien to 
the nature of that text is doomed to failure. To seek another dimension in a 
text that is watertight in the way of the realistic ones seems obtrusive and 
forced: an act of violence and encroachment on the artistic integrity of the 
text. Conversely, the modernist texts in art and literature require a specific 
and well-wrought mode of interpretation that takes into account their subtle 
particularity and linguistic concision. In this context, its is necessary to recall 
Eco's useful differentiation between 'closed' and 'open' texts: The former are 
texts that expect clear-cut and invariable interpretations, while the latter are 
texts like Joyce's Finnegan's Wake (1939), which is meant to provide 
grounds for all types of interpretation. The open ones are known for their 
potential to be interpreted on more than one level of signification, provided 
the reader is sufficiently competent to do so (Eco 1979: 79). In other words, 
interpretation as viewed by those raising its banner appears to be an act of 
freedom, an attempt that aims—to use Macherey's phrase—'to enlarge the 
myopic vision of criticism' (Macherey 1978: 174). Indeed, the best, most 
ingenious interpretations can produce weighty and impressive texts that can 
be read and enjoyed as autonomous entities provided that they do not go too 
far in their exegeses and shun reductive strategies in their handling of 
interpretive materials.                                                                                                    
 
II 
 
  The above-mentioned arguments might give the false impression that 
the concept of interpretation is unanimously accepted. In fact, the opposite is 
true. There has been a great deal of distrust and fear of interpretation's 
reductive and allegedly subversive effects on the text—and to a less extent, 
the reader. So-called humanist thinkers and critics always look askance at 
this activity, doubting its practices and intentions. In many cases, these 
misgivings and scruples emerge as justified; interpretation does have                
its undermining effects on the process of understanding, which it 
(interpretation) is meant to heighten and intensify. Needless to say, Susan 
Sontag's 'Against Inter-pretation' (1967) is an exemplary text here. The 
whole article is a ruthless debunking of the interpretive act—which, in her 
view, does much harm and violence to the texts being interpreted. In her 
argument, the first misstep is the blurring of boundaries between art and 
other disciplines, assimilating 'Art into Thought, or, worse still, Art into 
Culture' (Lodge 1974: 660). What is of primary interest for Sontag is artistic 
integrity and autonomy, which will be lost forever once the act of 
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interpretation is practiced 'much less to squeeze content of the work that is 
already there…In a place of a hermeneutics, we need an erotics of art!' 
(Ibid.: 660). Sontag refuses the relegation of form to the simple level of 
"accessory" and suggests that only "content" is necessary (Ibid.: 633).The 
task of interpretation is really one of translation: 'The interpreter says,           
look, don't you see that X is really—or really means—A? That Y is really 
B?' (Ibid.: 654) After many examples of the indiscriminate cases of 
interpretation and its excesses, Sontag prepares us for her shocking verdict, 
which is simply that interpretation is 'a means of revising, transvaluing, of 
escaping the dead past. In the cultural contexts, it is reactionary, impertinent, 
cowardly, stifling' (Ibid.: 655).                                    
      Sontag is, of course, an exception in arguing vehemently 'against' 
anything transgressing the artistic integrity and the indivisible unity of form 
and content. However, there have been other creative writers and critics who 
have been no less adamant in their condemnation of the interpretive process 
and its ostensibly subversive role in art and literature. The name of the 
Russian writer Tolstoy figures largely here; he argues along similar lines in 
his renowned What is Art. With an argument that foreshadows the views of 
the so-called New Critics, he asserts that interpretation is virtually needless 
because the artistic text is actually a self-contained totality that never permits 
the touch of the interpreter's scalpel of dissection and artificial fragmenta-
tion, as it were:                            
  
Critics explain, what do they explain?  An artist, if he is a true artist, has in 
his work conveyed to others the feeling he has explained: what is there to 
explain? If the work is good as art, the feeling expressed by the artist, 
regardless of whether the work is moral, or immoral…all interpretation is 
superfluous…Artistic works can not be interpreted. (Tolstoy 1945: 94) 
 
The terrible experience of Beethoven's deafness is evidence used by 
Tolstoy to indict the interpreters who have defended the poor musician, even 
in the mess he has made in conveying his music (Ibid.: 97). All of this is 
indicative of the unreliability and unpredictability of interpretation as 
conceived of by the Russian novelist and cultural critic.                                                          
     Tolstoy has his own disciples and followers who will pursue his train 
of thought in seeing the whole interpretive enterprise as fundamentally 
redundant and generally suspect. Wayne Booth (1921–2005), in his 
'Freedom of Interpretation', argues in parallel terms that 'As the general 
domain of pure freedom thus becomes good per se, so long as it maintains             
its autonomy. A poem should not mean but be. To judge what it means             
or does is a form of tyranny' (Mitchell 1982: 54). One of the leading 
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deconstructionists, Harold Bloom (b.1930), warns us that 'poems do not 
have meaning at all,' and that 'the meaning of a poem can only be a poem, 
but another poem, a poem not itself' (Culler 1981: 178).The New Critics 
have already shown the fallacy or heresy of paraphrase (analysis and 
interpretation); such an act could violate, in their view, the unity and 
integrity of the poetic text and its well-wrought structure.                                                       
       Another charge directed against interpretation and its implications or 
misuses is ideological in nature. Seen from the wide perspective of criticism 
in its entirety, interpretation can be considered a debilitating activity that 
inflicts significant harm on the text rather than doing it a service. As Gerald 
Graff puts it,                                                                  
                             
Susan Sontag and Leslie Fiedler choose representative names here, 
suggesting that the entire artistic tradition in the West has been exposed to a 
kind of hypercritical imperialism, akin to the aggression and lust for conquest 
of the bourgeois. The analytic and interpretive criticism neutralize and 
domesticate its perpetually liberating energies. (Ibid.: 31)  
 
Here, the critical argument tends to place interpretation within the 
hegemony of politics or in a position of undoing or resisting. Another critic, 
Hayden White, in his 'The Politics of Interpretation', finds that disinterested 
interpretation is virtually impossible: 'The disinterested and 'pure' inter-
pretation', the enquiry into anything whatsoever unthinkable as an ideal 
without the presupposition of the kind of activity which politics resents' 
(Mitchell 1982: 120). Politics and ideology, as a matter of fact, do play a 
vital role in boosting or subverting all types of interpretation in accordance 
with the perspective adopted. In contrast to the formalists, structuralists, and 
post-structuralists, the advocates of politics in criticism (especially the 
Marxists) see the text differently. If the reader-response theorists find that 
the full meaning cannot be fully attained without the fruitful collaboration of 
the reader, Pierre Macherey sees the matter differently. He is of the opinion 
that whatever the reader or interpreter does, his job remains that of 
'repetition [in which] they say more by saying less'—that 'the interpreter 
accomplishes his liberating violence' (1978: 76). In other words, Macherey 
takes the monosemic principle for granted in that the original authorial 
meaning is a factor to be taken into account in judging the final message. In 
other words, he does not believe in the text's potential to generate new 
concepts and meanings. In this type of argument, the author seems to be the 
master of the situation and the sole controller of its meaning. In the same 
vein lies the argument of Frederic Jameson's 'the Political Unconsciousness'. 
As a Marxist, Jameson feels that all interpretive methods are geared toward 
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'one interpretive code or 'master code' according to which the text is 
rewritten' (McGuirk 1994: 99). Indeed, Jameson repeats Tolstoy's argument 
verbatim in his insistence on the invalidity of interpretation and its dubious 
intentions:       
                               
All thinking about interpretation must sink itself into strangeness, the 
unnaturalness of the hermeneutic situation; or, to put it another way, every 
individual interpretation must include an interpretation of its own existence, 
must show its own credentials and justify itself: Every commentary must be 
at the same time a meta-commentary. (Ibid.: 202) 
 
  If we piece together the pro and con arguments about interpretation, it 
becomes evident that the issue has reached such a degree of complication 
and polarisation that it is very hard to reach any sort of compromise or 
reconciliation. As a matter of fact, the afore-mentioned arguments show that 
the ordinary activity of interpretation, which any individual may mentally 
perform while exposed to the act of reading, is difficult to settle or reach. It 
is this rigmarole about a very ordinary or even a natural activity that renders 
Northrop Frye impatient; he calls for an end to all such views, suggesting 
that 'the critical theory has elapsed into a confused and claustrophobic battle 
of methodologies where as in Fortinbras's campaign in Hamlet, the ground 
fought for is hardly big enough to hold the contending armies' (Harris         
1988: 1).                                                                                                         
        All of what has hitherto been said about the excesses and loopholes of 
interpretation may sound a bit biased or unnecessarily exaggerated. 
However, it is not. Any passing look at critical texts, whether in art, history, 
philosophy, anthropology or epistemology, will attest to the validity of many 
of the views raised against interpretation or at least will acknowledge its 
wild and unrestrained extravagance. The reason is simple enough. The 
interpretive paradigm that is expected or supposed to be highlighting, 
foregrounding, disambiguating and illuminating new horizons and vistas in 
literary and intellectual texts gives way to counter-interpretations that, in 
turn, generate further interpretations ad infinitum. Even in ordinary 
conversation some statements are put in such equivocal terms that the final 
meaning becomes too difficult to pinpoint. I think Trilling's comment on 
Frost's poetry and Frost the man is highly relevant here and shows the extent 
of the mystification that language can entail. Lionel Trilling gave an after-
dinner address in which he specified some poems that he admired. This led 
him to call Frost 'a terrifying poet who depicted a terrifying universe' 
(Johnson 1983: 184). In that awkward situation, Frost failed to interpret the 
message behind those words: He was not sure whether he had been praised 
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or attacked. Also, many of his friends were 'outraged (as they took the 
speech to mean the second) and all that caused a furor' (Ibid.: 184).The right 
interpretation in a situation like this might lead to self-satisfaction or 
discontent, depending on how the same words are viewed and judged.                                   
         One of the serious limitations of interpretation is that the desire of the 
interpreter to find as many interpretations as possible may entice the 
individual undertaking this act to interpolate or make up certain points that 
may not be there or at least may not have been intended by the author. 
Indeed, some of these interpretations are often imposed on the text being 
interpreted simply because of the interpreter's own desire to show his skill or 
ideological and intellectual biases. Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness 
(1902) is one of those texts in which a certain consensus cannot be easily 
reached. The novel and its writer have been criticised as lacking the 
convincingness of his other novels: 'Conrad was helpless against his own 
compulsions and he wrote as a generalist', as Marianna Torgovnick asserts 
(Nadelhaft 1991: 31). Conversely, Conrad's novel appears to be the pioneer 
of everything suggesting avant-garde and contemporary trends in criticism 
and art. Indeed, the list of the views and schools of art and literary theory 
supposedly suggested by Conrad's novel is too long to believe and accept as 
reasonable and plausible. If we accept all these as legitimate, Conrad begins 
to resemble a critic writing a critical treatise rather than a novelist writing a 
work of fiction. The biographical information about Conrad shows that the 
man did not contribute to the abstract theories in which contemporary 
literary theory is fully steeped. Here is the interpretation of Marlowe's and 
Kurtz's experiences in the Congo,                                                                              
 
The narrative dexterously embodies literary theories which were to be 
formulated: defamiliarization, deconstruction, delayed decoding, covert 
plotting...(It) can be related to a diversity of  traditions, generic and technical, 
including, political satire, protest literature, traveler's tale, psychological 
odyssey, symbolic novel, mediated autobiography. (Watts 1990: xv) 
 
This example of interpretation shows how the text is subjected to all 
types of reading and obtrusive discourse, including those that the author 
never contemplated. Any common-sensical view of Conrad's novel is bound 
to rule out most of this as the too-inflated and too-enforced exegesis of a sea 
novel about colonialism and cultural and racial conflicts.                                                   
        Shakespeare's Hamlet is another instance of the contrasting views that 
interpretation can eventually lead to. There is a wide variety of surprising 
judgments of the play and its writer, some of which are implausible. 
Curiously, the arguments turn out to be in defence of or to reject older 
 40
IJAPS, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 2010) Interpretation: The Infinite Controversy 
interpretations that do not appeal to the newer interpreter. It seems that the 
last thing interpreters can think of is the common reader who receives the 
brunt of all these clever and dazzling views. The result is the inevitable loss 
of the original, spontaneous signification of the text as understood by its first 
theatre-goers or the author. If Bradley (1904: 93) stresses the morality of the 
text—'the violent shock of the hero's moral being'—the romantic poet and 
critic Coleridge, finds in the hero an alter-ego: 'I have a smack of Hamlet 
myself, if I may say so' (Bate 1972: 18). C.S. Lewis (1942: 149) sees the   
predominance of lyrical and linguistic aspects at the expense of the dramatic 
ones, which is not to the play's favour. The same holds true for T.S. Eliot's 
seminal assessment of the play as an artistic failure; it lacks, in Eliot's view, 
'the objective correlative'. 'That is why Shakespeare has left superfluous and 
inconsistent scenes' (Eliot 1996: 13), he suggests. Ernest Jones, a loyal 
disciple of the Freudian school, sees in Hamlet the incarnation of the  
Oedipus complex, 'a mini Claudius who is strongly attached to his mother' 
(Jones 1949: 86).Worse still, Hamlet is relegated to the position of a female 
or effeminate individual 'who longs for the male closeness as seen in the 
idealisation of his father and Horatio' (Leverenz 1992: 135). Paradoxically, 
the biographical interpretation of the play and its author is not provided by a 
critical account; rather the account is a creative text this time. It is James 
Joyce's Ulysses (1922), where Joyce's mouthpiece, Stephen Dedalus, 
discusses the play from a biographical angle. His argument, albeit one that 
inspires questions, is worth quoting in some detail:                                                                  
                                                                
Shakespeare is to be identified with the ghost of the murdered king…as actor, 
he himself played…Ann Hathaway was eight years older than William 
Shakespeare, and she took the initiative…after three years of domesticity, he 
left to seek his fortune in the capital. While he was away, over himself. 
(Budgeon 1972: 111) 
 
       In contrast, John Dover Wilson finds that there should be a certain 
distance between the dramatic persona and the actual events: 'There is no 
Hamlet; he is a really dramatic persona and should not be dealt with in terms 
of modern psychology' (1935: 218). Such a laudable appraisal of the 
character and its creator is rare, given the sizeable number of interpretations 
in which the writer and his persona have become exchangeable.                                         
        From a New-Historicist viewpoint, Hamlet appears to be muddled and 
to lack coherence. The play appears to be 'a contradictory, transient text, and 
one not yet fully assimilated into the discursive order which has claimed it: 
the promise of essential subjectivity remains unfulfilled' (Barker 1992: 164). 
The fact of the matter is that it is next to impossible to cover all 
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interpretations of the play, its hero, and its author: the writings of patriotists, 
linguists, existentialists, Marxists, nihilists, romantics, philosophers, 
feminists, historians, art directors, aestheticians, deconstructionists, 
sociologists, formalists, advocates of the archetypal school of criticism, etc. 
However, the question that must be posed here is which of these 
interpretations is the right one, and which has the plausibility to be the 
conclusive. The maze of interpretations only serves to further complicate an 
already complicated issue. The answer to this question becomes the more 
demanding, tantalising and challenging if we recall the ostensible tone of 
plausibility and persuasiveness in which these interpretations are put. The 
only thing of which one can be fairly certain is that Shakespeare could not 
have thought of all these possibilities when writing this or dreamt that his 
play could arouse all such heated and inexhaustible controversy. Had he 
thought in the same manner as his interpreters think or as they have sought 
to use to convince us, he would probably have spent all his life revising, 
deleting and expanding his play in the way Walt Whitman did with his 
Leaves of Grass. It is helpful here to recall Nietzsche's comment that the 
contradiction attributed to the author is not found often in the author's book 
but in the reader's mind (Nietzsche 2001: 19). Contemporary theorists in 
criticism and semiotics have shown that over-interpretation can become a 
limiting (if not harmful) pursuit. This is what Jonathan Culler warns us about 
in his insightful analogy:                                                        
                                                                       
One might imagine overinterpretation to be like overeating: there is proper 
eating or interpreting, but some people do not stop when they should. They 
go on eating or interpreting in excess, with bad results. (Culler 2007: 168) 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In short, the present study has hopefully shown some manifestations of the 
problematic nature of interpretation in contemporary literary theory. 
Interpretation is the repository of polar opposite and otherwise incompatible 
views in favour of or against particular judgments or readings (or even mis-
readings). The attitude displayed over the course of the present study has 
been ambivalent: It gives an account of the phenomenon in question, its 
principles, its justifications and arguments against it. It is obvious that 
criticism, once stripped of the ingenious and weighty contributions of 
interpretation, will be drastically inadequate and impotent. Indeed, 
interpretation, despite what has already been stated about its negative 
repercussions, remains an indispensable and invaluable tool for judging a 
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text's richness and multi-levelled potentiality. As such, it deservedly engages 
the great space in literary theory, whether in terms of agreement or 
detraction, adoption or castigation. In all these interpretation remains a 
tempting device for exercising one's skill, wit and intelligence to see what 
the text has in store for us—if it is a truly great or valuable one.                                             
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